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Fighting Against Biopiracy:
Does the Obligation to Disclose in
Patent Applications Truly Help?
Jacques de Werra*
ABSTRACT

In the global fight against biopiracy, one of the key issues is
to prevent the grant and exploitation of patents on traditional
knowledge and genetic resources by requiring that patent
applicants for inventions involving traditional knowledge and
genetic resources disclose the source of those resources and
provide evidence that the prior informed consent of the local
owners of such resources has been obtained and that benefitsharing agreements have been entered into with those owners.
This Article argues that a legal discussion of biopiracy
should analyze the obligation to disclose the use of traditional
knowledge and genetic resources in an invention beyond the
sanctions that are attached in case of violation of such
obligations as previously discussed at the international level.
These issues should be addressed in light of the key objectives to
be achieved: to ensure the effective sharing of benefits resulting
from the use of such resources with the local communities that
own them, and to implement appropriate mechanisms for this
purpose. In the course of the analysis, this Article adopts an
interdisciplinary approach by referring to rules governing the
legal protection of tangible and intangible cultural property in
order to explore the extent to which they could be used as models
for a regime of protection against the misappropriation of
traditionalknowledge and genetic resources. This approach is
inspired by the similarity between biopiracy and the

* Professor of intellectual property law and contract law at the Law School of the
University of Geneva (Switzerland); LL.M. (Columbia Law School 2001); co-director of
the Geneva Art Law Centre (www.art-law.org); jacques.dewerra@unige.ch. A slightly
shorter version of this paper is published in a collective book edited by Prof. Toshiyuki
Kono (Kyushu University), INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
COMMUNITIES, CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, which is published by
Intersentia (www.intersentia.be). This Article originates in a presentation made by its
Author at an international conference on Intangible Cultural Heritage and Intellectual
Property under the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage held in New Delhi in March 2007 (http://www.law.kyushu-u.ac.jp/
programsinenglish/new-delhi/india/Home.html).
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misappropriationof culturalproperty goods, which constitutes a
kind of "culturalpiracy." This Article concludes that balanced,
flexible, and interdisciplinarysolutions are required in order to
ensure that the interests of local communities are protected
without unduly threatening the interests of their commercial
partners.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the global fight against biopiracy,' one of the most important
issues-as identified in the report entitled The Protection of Traditional
Knowledge: Draft Objectives and Principles; 2 prepared under the
auspices of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folkloreis to "[p]reclude the grant of improper [intellectual property] rights to
unauthorized parties. '3 More specifically, the goal is to
curtail the grant or exercise of improper intellectual property rights
over traditional knowledge and associated genetic resources, by
requiring, in particular, as a condition for the granting of patent rights,
that patent applicants for inventions involving traditional knowledge
and associated genetic resources disclose the source and country of
origin of those resources, as well as evidence of prior informed consent
and benefit-sharing conditions have been complied with in the country
4
of origin.

According to the Draft Traditional
"[t]raditional
knowledge
shall
be
misappropriation. '5 To accomplish this,

Knowledge Principles,
protected
against

legal means should be provided to prevent.., false claims or assertions
of ownership or control over traditional knowledge, including acquiring,
claiming or asserting intellectual property rights over traditional
knowledge-related subject matter when those intellectual property

1.
See generally IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS, AND
INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE (2006) (discussing the global biopiracy phenomenon);
ANDREW MUSHITA & CAROL B. THOMPSON, BIOPIRACY OF BIODIVERSITY: GLOBAL
EXCHANGE AS ENCLOSURE (2007) (discussing how biopiracy by powerful corporations
and wealthy countries is destroying biodiversity). For practical examples, see JAY
McGOWN, OUT OF AFRICA: MYSTERIES OF ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING (2006),
available at http://www.edmonds-institute.org/ outofafrica.pdf (explaining a month long
study of biopiracy and benefit sharing agreements in Africa); World Trade
Organization, Combating Biopiracy-The Peruvian Experience, IP/C[W/493 (Sept. 19,
2007) (describing the examples listed in the document filed by Peru with the World
Trade Organization).
2.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Committee
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
[WIPO Intergovernmental IP Committee], The Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
Draft Objectives and Principles, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/10/5 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tklen/wipo-grtkf ic10/wipo-grtkf-ic10_5.pdf
[hereinafter Draft TK Principles].
3.
Id. annex, at 1.
4.
Id. annex, at 4-5, xiv.
5.
Id. annex, at 12, art. 1(1).
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rights are not validly held in the light of that traditional knowledge and
6
any conditions relating to its access.

Various countries have formulated proposals advocating the
inclusion of such a disclosure obligation in a variety of international
patent law conventions. 7 Others have adopted, or are discussing,
national regulations to the same end. 8 Three different proposals for
implementing this obligation at the international level can currently
be identified: 9 (1) the TRIPS Disclosure Proposal; 10 (2) the PCT
12
Disclosure Proposal;" and (3) the Mandatory Disclosure Proposal.
The most protective of the three is the TRIPS Disclosure
Proposal, which was proposed primarily by Brazil and India, with

6.
Id. annex, at 12, art. 1(3)(iii).
7.
Other proposals have been formulated in scientific publications. See, e.g.,
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and
Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS
Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 371, 396-98 (2000)
(pleading for an application of the "unclean hands" doctrine); United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Analysis of Options for
Implementing Disclosure of Origin Requirements in Intellectual Property Applications,
at
4-5,
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2004/14
(Feb.
15,
2006),
available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted200514_en.pdf
(discussing various available
policy options).
8.
See, e.g., Loi f~d~rale sur les brevets d'invention [LBI], June 22, 2007, FF
4363 (2007), art. 49(a) (Switz.), availableat http://www.admin.chlch/f/ff/ 2007/4363.pdf
(introduced by the amendments to the Swiss Patent Act which were adopted by the
Swiss Parliament on June 22, 2007 and entered into force on July 1, 2008); Charles C.
Liu & Jeanne J. Liu, Waves of Changes in Chinese Patent Law and Regulations-Part
IV,
20
CHINA
INTELL.
PROP.
44,
44-51
(2007),
available
at
http://www.chinabiotoday.com/articles/20080131-1
(describing the draft changes
contemplated in the Chinese patent law on this issue); David Cochrane, Africa: Patents
Act Amended to Protect Genetic Resources, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Mar. 2008,
available at http://www.managingip.com/Articlel1886062/Patents-Act-amended-toprotect-genetic-resources.html (describing the situation in South Africa).
9.
This tripartite division is based on a note which was drafted by the World
Trade Organization [WTO] Secretariat, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Note by the Secretariat:The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement
and the Convention on Biological Diversity-Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made,
14, IP/C/W/368/Rev.1 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
tratope/tripse/ipcw368_e.doc [hereinafter WTO Summary]. For the summary of the
different approaches, see WTO, TRIPS: Reviews, Article 27.3(b) and Related IssuesBackground and
the
Current Situation, http://www.wto.orglenglishtratop-el
trips_e/art27 3b-backgrounde.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008). For an updated status of
the negotiation process at the WTO as of June 2008, see the report on "GI extension" and
biodiversity consultations, General Counsel Trade Negotiations Committee, Report by the
Director-General: Issues Related To the Extension of the Protection of Geographical
Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products Other Than
Wines and Spirits and Those Related to the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, WT/GC/W/591 (June 9, 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/giextension-cbd - dgreport-9jun8-e.pdf.
10.
See infra text accompanying notes 13-17.
11.
See infra text accompanying notes 18-24.
12.
See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
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assistance from other countries. 13 Under its terms, a patent can be

granted only if the patent application includes'information regarding
or evidence of (1) the source of the invention, its country of origin, and
the countries of origin of the biological resources and traditional
knowledge used in the invention; (2) the obtainment of prior informed
consent from the authorities under the relevant national regime; and
(3) fair and equitable benefit sharing under the relevant national
regime. 14 If a patent applicant violates these obligations, the
potential sanctions could include the revocation of the patent, the
narrowing of the scope of the patent, and the "full or partial transfer
of the rights to the invention ... where full disclosure would have
shown that another person or community or governmental agency is
the inventor or part inventor. ' 15 The TRIPS Disclosure Proposal is
meant to be formally implemented in the Agreement on Trade16
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
17
at Article 29bis.

13.
Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil's IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private
Property Rights, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 71-72 (discussing Brazil and India's
involvement and leadership in the TRIPS Disclosure Proposal).
14.
WTO Summary, supra note 9, 71.
15.
Id.
75; see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge-Elements of
the Obligation to Disclose Evidence of Benefit-Sharing Under the Relevant National
Regime, IP/CIW/442 (Mar. 18, 2005), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/IP/CIW442.doc [hereinafter WTO Interpretation of Relationship
Between TRIPS and CBD] (circulating a submission by India, Brazil, and other
member countries, to the Council).
Where the failure to provide evidence of benefit-sharing is discovered after the
grant of a patent, the legal effect could include:
*

Revocation of the patent where it is determined that there is fraudulent
intention behind the failure to provide evidence of benefit-sharing. In
addition to, or as an alternative to revocation, criminal and/or
administrative sanctions may also be imposed, in particular, to ensure
adequate compensation where it is eventually determined that no
benefits were shared or are intended to be shared;

*

Full or partial transfer of the rights to the invention, also as an
alternative to revocation, as a means of promoting fair and equitable
benefit-sharing.).

WTO Interpretationof Relationship Between TRIPS and CBD, supra, 14.
16.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
17.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Doha
Work Programme-TheOutstandingImplementationIssue on the Relationship between
the TRIPS Agreement and the Conventional on Biological Diversity, at 1-2,
WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2
(Jul. 5,
2006),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/ip/c/w474.doc (containing the draft of Article 29bis of TRIPS
Agreement as proposed by Brazil, China, Columbia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru,
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The PCT Disclosure Proposal, authored by Switzerland, 18 is
based on a proposed amendment to the Regulations under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT Regulations). 19 Under this amendment,
national patent law could 20 require a patent applicant to declare the
source of genetic resources and traditional knowledge in a patent
application. 21 The absence of compliance by the patent applicant with
the formal requirement could lead to the denial of the application by
the relevant patent office. 2 2 However, if the applicant's failure to

Thailand, and Tanzania). It appears that this approach is gaining momentum and
support among members states of the WTO. See Kaitlin Mara & William New, TRIPS
Council: Half of WTO Membership Backs Biodiversity Amendment, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Mar. 14, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=961 (describing
the issues and interests discussed at last triennial meeting).
18.
WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty [WIPO
PCT Working Group], Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the
Source of Genetic Resources and TraditionalKnowledge in Patent Applications, at 1,
PCT/RIWG/4/13 (May 5, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
pct/en/pct-r-wg 4/pctr.wg_4_13.pdf; WIPO PCT Working Group, Proposals by
Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, at 1, PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev. (Nov. 19,
2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct-rwg_5/pct-r-wg_
5 11_rev.pdf [hereinafter Switzerland Nov. 2003 Proposal].
19.
Regulations Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, available
at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct-regs.pdf [hereinafter PCT Regulations] (as
in force from July 1, 2008).
20.
The PCT Disclosure Proposal is optional and is left to the decision of the
individual countries. See Switzerland Nov. 2003 Proposal, supra note 18, annex, at 2
("[T]he Contracting Parties of the PLT would be able to require in their national patent
laws that patent applicants declare the source of genetic resources and/or traditional
knowledge in national patent applications.").
21.
WTO Summary, supra note 9,
81; see also WIPO PCT Working Group,
Additional Comments by Switzerland on Its ProposalsRegarding the Declarationof the
Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications,
PCT/R/WG/6/11, at 4 (Apr. 21,
2004), available at http://www.wipo.int
edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct rwg_6/pctr wg_6_ll1.doc [hereinafter Switzerland Apr. 2004
Comments]. The new proposed Rule 51bis.l(g) of PCT Regulations, supra note 19,
would then read as follows:
(g)

The national law applicable by the designated Office may, in accordance
with Article 27, require the applicant
(i)

(ii)

to declare the source of a specific genetic resource to which the
inventor has had access, if an invention is directly based on such a
resource; if such source is unknown, this shall be declared
accordingly;
to declare the source of knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, if the inventor knows that an
invention is directly based on such knowledge, innovations and
practices; if such source is unknown, this shall be declared
accordingly.

Switzerland Apr. 2004 Comments, supra, at 4.
22.
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Additional Comments by Switzerland on Its Proposals Submitted to WIPO Regarding
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disclose the source of the invention or the submission of false
information was discovered after the granting of the patent, the
patent's validity would only be affected if it was found that the
applicant had fraudulent intentions. 2 3 In such a case, sanctions
24
outside of patent law could also be imposed.
The third proposal, the Mandatory Disclosure Proposal, was
made by the European Union. Pursuant to this proposal, each
country shall "require all patent applicants to disclose information on
the country of origin or source of genetic resources used in the
invention which applicants know or have reason to know. ' 25 Under
this proposal, the failure or refusal of the patent applicant to provide
the required information would terminate the processing of the
patent application. 26 However, after the grant of the patent, the
sanction imposed on an applicant who provided incorrect or
incomplete information would lie outside of patent law. 27 Each
country would retain the ability to determine the sanctions it would
impose in the case of a violation of the disclosure requirement. 28 As
expressed in a submission of the European Union, this proposal
supposes that
[m]eaningful and workable sanctions should be attached to the
provision of incorrect or incomplete information. Where it is proved
that the patent applicant has disclosed incorrect or incomplete
information, effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions outside
the field of patent law should be imposed on the patent applicant or
holder.... For reasons of legal certainty, the submission of incorrect or

the Declarationof the Source of Genetic Resources and TraditionalKnowledge in Patent
Applications, IP/CIW/423 (June 14, 2004) (containing the document submitted by
Switzerland to the WTO); WTO Summary, supra note 9, at 32, 84.
23.
See Patent Law Treaty, art. 10(1), June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047 (2000),
available at http://www.wipo.intltreaties/en/ip/plt/trtdocswo038.html
[hereinafter
PLT].
Non-compliance with one or more of the formal requirements referred to in
Articles 6(1), (2), (4) and (5) and 8(1) to (4) with respect to an application may
not be a ground for revocation or invalidation of a patent, either totally or in
part, except where the non-compliance with the formal requirement occurred as
a result of a fraudulent intention.

Id.
24.
WTO Summary, supra note 9, 84.
25.
Id. 87.
26.
Id. 88.
27.
Id.
28.
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States,
55,
IP/C/W/383 (Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter EU Proposal] ('Legal consequences to the nonrespect of the requirement should lie outside the ambit of patent law, such as for
example in civil law (claim for compensation) or in administrative law (fee for refusal
to submit information to the authorities or for submitting wrong information."); WTO

Summary, supranote 9,

88.
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incomplete information should not have any effect on the validity of the
granted patent or on its enforceability against patent infringers.

It must be left to the individual Contracting State to determine the
character and the level of these sanctions, in accordance with
29
domestic legal practices and respecting general principles of law.
Among the three options mentioned above, the TRIPS Disclosure
Proposal is obviously the most protective of the interests of local
communities due to its extensive reach. 30 Indeed, it presupposes the
creation of a benefit-sharing agreement between the applicant and
the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, if one were to try to answer the
question raised in the title of this Article as to whether the obligation
to disclose truly helps communities, 31 one might conclude that the
TRIPS Disclosure Proposal would be the most effective because it
requires the patent applicant to prove benefit sharing with
communities when filing a patent application. However, in spite of
its appeal, the TRIPS Disclosure Proposal seems unlikely to be
implemented at the global level because of the opposition it faces in
32
political spheres and the delicate legal issues that it raises.
On this basis, the goal of this Article is to assess whether the
obligation to disclose the use of traditional knowledge and of

29.
WIPO Intergovernmental IP Committee, Disclosure of Origin or Source of
Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications,
annex,
6, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11 (May 17, 2005) [hereinafter Disclosure of Origin or
Source of Genetic Resources] (containing the document submitted by the European
Union and its member states).
30.
For a definition of the concept of the communities, see Draft TK Principles,
supra note 2, annex, at 24, art. 5.
Protection of traditional knowledge should benefit the communities who
generate, preserve and transmit the knowledge in a traditional and
intergenerational context, who are associated with it and who identify with it
in accordance with Article 4.
Protection should accordingly benefit the
indigenous and traditional communities themselves that hold traditional
knowledge in this manner, as well as recognized individuals within these
communities and peoples. Entitlement to the benefits of protection should, as
far as possible and appropriate, take account of the customary protocols,
understandings, laws and practices of these communities and peoples.

Id.
31.
This Article does not address the complex issue of the determination of
ownership of traditional knowledge and simply considers that communities should be
treated as the owners, even though other stakeholders may be involved (such as the
states from which the traditional knowledge originates, as may be inferred from the
wording of the Convention on Biological Diversity, infra note 39, art. 15).
32.
See WTO Summary, supra note 9,
118 (presenting a view that it is not
"feasible to require, in addition to the declaration of the source of genetic resources,
evidence of prior informed consent and benefit sharing"); see also Martin A. Girsberger,
Transparency Measures Under Patent Law Regarding Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge: Disclosure of Source and Evidence of Prior Informed Consent
and Benefit-Sharing, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 451, 476-77, 485 (2004) (describing the
legal and practical problems with informed consent and benefit-sharing).
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associated genetic resources (hereinafter jointly referred to as
"traditional knowledge") in an invention truly helps communities that
create and own traditional knowledge. For this purpose, the Article
focuses on whether the obligation to disclose (resulting in particular
from the PCT Disclosure Proposal and the Mandatory Disclosure
Proposal), as well as the sanctions attached to a violation, provide a
suitable legal framework for allowing effective benefit sharing for
communities.
In view of this focus, the Article does not comprehensively
discuss the other complex issues relating to the implementation of the
33
obligation to disclose, such as the so-called trigger of the disclosure
(i.e., what connection must exist between the traditional knowledge
and the invention for which the patent application has been filed in
order to trigger the obligation to disclose),3 4 nor does it discuss the
permissibility of the obligation to disclose under international
instruments, most specifically with the TRIPS Agreement. 35 Instead,
it focuses on assessing the effectiveness of the obligation to disclose,
which can be viewed as a defensive measure 36-an "anti-appropriation
initiative" 3 7-and does not discuss the creation of a sui generis right
to be adopted for the purpose of positively protecting traditional
38
knowledge.
Part II of this Article describes the origins and limits of the
obligation to disclose and concludes that the obligation to disclose is
not sufficient to protect communities. Part III discusses alternative
approaches to the obligation to disclose that may ensure real benefit
sharing for communities. In Part III.A, the Article draws an analogy
to the legal protection of tangible cultural property in order to explore
how that regime could serve as a model for the protection of
traditional knowledge. The Article also examines how the goal of

33.
WTO Summary, supra note 9, 125.
34.
See id. (discussing the trigger for disclosure).
35.
See Graham Dutfield, Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity: Is There a Role
for the Patent System?, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 899, 920-22 (2005) (discussing
compliance of the obligation to disclose with the TRIPS Agreement); see also Nuno
Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman's Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPSConsistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and PriorInformed
Consent, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 111 (2005) (explaining the obligation to disclose the
origin of genetic resources and prior informed consent and the ways this requirement
may be adopted in accordance with international law).
36.

See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: PATHWAYS

TO THE FUTURE 25 (2006) (discussing the defensive protections against
misappropriation of traditional knowledge).
37.
See Chidi Oguamanam, Documentation and Digitization of Traditional
Knowledge and Intangible Cultural Heritage, in INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE AND
INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY:

COMMUNITIES,

CULTURAL DIVERSITY

AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, at 357 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., forthcoming 2009).
38.
This issue is also discussed extensively in Disclosure of Origin or Source of
Genetic Resources, supra note 29, 6.
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benefit sharing could be achieved, at the level both of substantive law
in Part III.B and of procedural law-i.e,. enforcement and dispute
resolution-in Part III.C.

II.

ORIGINS AND LIMITS OF THE OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE

A. Origins
The debate about the obligation to disclose was initiated as a
result of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 39 which
concluded on June 5, 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, and which included 190
contracting parties. 40 The CBD provides for the obligations of access
to, benefit sharing of, and prior informed consent with regard to the
use of traditional knowledge. 4 1 Article 8 of the CBD provides that
[elach Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate:

(0) Subject

to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such
42
knowledge, innovationsand practices.

Article 15(7) of the CBD further provides that
[e]ach Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19
and, where necessary, through the financial mechanism established by
Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way
the results of researchand development and the benefits arisingfrom the
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the
Contracting Party providing such resources. Such sharing shall be
43
upon mutually agreed terms.

In implementing these goals, the Conference of the Parties to the
CBD (COP) adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out
of Their Utilization (Bonn Guidelines) at its sixth meeting, which

39.
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available
at http://www.biodiv.org/convention/convention.shtml [hereinafter CBD].
40.
For the list of contracting parties with status of adhesion or ratification, see
Convention on Biological Diversity, List of Parties, http://www.cbd.int/convention/
parties/list/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
41.
CBD, supra note 39, arts. 8(j), 10(c), 15, 16, 19.
42.
Id. art. 8() (emphasis added).
43.
Id. art. 15(7) (emphasis added).
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took place in The Hague on April 7-19, 2002.4 4 The Bonn Guidelines,
which only provide guidance and can be implemented on a voluntary
basis, are intended to "serve as inputs when developing and drafting
legislative, administrative or policy measures on access and benefitsharing with particular reference to provisions under Articles 8(j),
45
10(c), 15, 16 and 19" of the CBD.
With respect to the issue of benefit sharing, the Bonn Guidelines
contain a non-exhaustive list of potential methods of implementation.
Appendix II of the Guidelines provides a selection of monetary and
46
non-monetary benefits.

Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 6th
44.
mtg., The Hague, Apr. 7-9, 2002, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their Utilization, Decision
VI/24/A, UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20, available at http://www.cbd.intdecisions/?m=cop06&d=24 [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines].
1, 7(a).
Id. annex,
45.
Id., app. II entitled "Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits," provides:
46.
Monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:

1.

a.

Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired;

b.

Up-front payments;

c.
d.

Milestone payments;
Payment of royalties;

e.

Licence fees in case of commercialization;

Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and
f.
sustainable use of biodiversity;
Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed;
g.

2.

h.

Research funding;

i.

Joint ventures;

Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.
j.
Non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
a.

Sharing of research and development results;

b.

Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research
biotechnological
particularly
programmes,
and development
research activities, where possible in the provider country;

c.

Participation in product development;

d.

Collaboration, cooperation
training;

e.
f.

Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;
Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and
technology under fair and most favourable terms, including on
concessional and preferential terms where agreed, in particular,
knowledge and technology that make use of genetic resources,
including biotechnology, or that are relevant to the conservation and
sustainable utilization of biological diversity;

g.

Strengthening capacities for technology transfer to user developing
country Parties and to Parties that are countries with economies in
transition and technology development in the country of origin that

and contribution

in education

and
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At its sixth meeting, the COP added to the framework for the
obligation to disclose by inviting
Parties and Governments to encourage the disclosure of the country of
origin of genetic resources in applications for intellectual property
rights, where the subject matter of the application concerns or makes
use of genetic resources in its development, as a possible contribution to
tracking compliance with prior informed consent and the mutually
47
agreed terms on which access to those resources was granted.

The COP also invited
Parties and Governments to encourage the disclosure of the origin of
relevant traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities relevant for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity in applications for intellectual property
rights, where the subject matter of the application concerns or makes
48
use of such knowledge in its development.

The obligation to disclose in patent applications can thus be
conceived as "a possible contribution to tracking compliance with
prior informed consent and the mutually agreed terms on which
access to those resources was granted." 49 According to this
interpretation, disclosure essentially aims at creating transparency in

h.

provides genetic resources. Also to facilitate abilities of indigenous
and local communities to conserve and sustainably use their genetic
resources;
Institutional capacity-building;

i.

Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the
administration and enforcement of access regulations;

j.
k.

Training related to genetic resources with the full participation of
providing Parties, and where possible, in such Parties;
Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, including biological
inventories and taxonomic studies;

1.

Contributions to the local economy;

m.

Research directed towards priority needs, such as health and food
security, taking into account domestic uses of genetic resources in
provider countries;
Institutional and professional relationships that can arise from an
access and benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collaborative
activities;

n.

o.

Food and livelihood security benefits;

p.

Social recognition;

q.

Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.

47.
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 6th
mtg., The Hague, Apr. 7-9, 2002, Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the
Implementation of Access and Benefit.sharing Arrangements,
1, Decision V1124/C,
UNEP/CBD/COP/6120, available at http://www.cbd.int/decisions/?m=cop-06&d=24.

48.

Id.

2.

49.

Id.

1.
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the patent application process. 50 However, although the obligation to
disclose has raised awareness about the CBD and the issue of benefit
sharing, experiences from various countries suggest that the goal of
transparency has not been fully achieved. 51 It is thus important to
address the limits of the obligation to disclose.
B. Limits
Even though the obligation to disclose and the sanctions for its
violation, both in the PCT Disclosure Proposal and in the Mandatory
Disclosure Proposal, could deter potential violators in many
circumstances, it appears that in some instances they are insufficient
to ensure benefit sharing for communities. This situation essentially
results from the fact that, except for in very specific circumstances
(i.e., circumstances in which, as envisioned in the PCT Disclosure
Proposal, the fraudulent intent of the patent applicant can be
established under Article 10 of the Patent Law Treaty),52 the validity
of a patent could not be challenged by communities once it had been
granted, even if the patented invention misappropriated traditional
knowledge.
In addition, the fact that bad faith patent applicants might incur
criminal sanctions may not prove deterrent to the extent that
criminal sanctions would be imposed on physical persons and not on
53
corporate entities, as is generally the case in civil law countries.
Such corporate entities might thus remain unpunished even though
they would receive the financial benefits of the grant of a patent
54
based on misappropriated traditional knowledge.
55
sanctions generally
In addition, any criminal or even civil
(willful
or negligent).
of
tortious
intent
require a showing

50.
Transparency is one of the key principles underpinning the Bonn
Guidelines.Bonn Guidelines, supranote 44, annex, 7(h).
51.
Alison L. Hoare & Richard G. Tarasofsky, Asking and Telling: Can
"Disclosureof Origin" Requirements in Patent Applications Make a Difference?, 10 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 149, 158 (2007).

52.
PLT, supra note 23, art. 10(1).
53.
In fact, there is substantial debate over how national legislation should
respond to non-disclosure. Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 51, at 154-55. Some
countries, such as Norway and Denmark, impose criminal sanctions in cases of where
correct information has not been provided. Id. at 155. On the other hand, Sweden
decided to introduce a voluntary requirement, with no sanctions for non-compliance,
because their civil code does not allow criminal prosecution for false declarations on
patent applications. Id.
54.
Criminal sanctions could thus be imposed on outside patent agents who
have been hired and instructed by corporate entities (the future owners of the patents),
even though sanctions should essentially target these entities themselves and not their
patent agents.
55.
According to a submission by the European Union, a civil claim for
54-56.
compensation could be considered. EU Proposal,supra note 28,
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Consequently, these sanctions would not be applicable in a scenario
in which the patent applicant was effectively unaware of pre-existing
traditional knowledge, even after having conducted proper due
diligence. 56 In such a case, the applicant, even while acting in good
faith, would not have disclosed the presence of any traditional
knowledge during the patent application process. Such an applicant
could escape criminal or civil sanctions and might also avoid any risk
of cancellation of the patent, since there would have been no
fraudulent behavior. Perhaps a more realistic scenario is that an
entity could acquire a patent or a patent application in good faith
from a third party, which may itself have misappropriated traditional
knowledge when filing the patent application. In these circumstances
too, criminal or civil sanctions might not easily be imposed on such a
patent holder if there is no evidence of bad faith.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the cancellation of a
patent, which various proposals envision as a potential sanction,
would bring any benefit to communities or allow any benefit sharing.
As Norway accurately noted in a submission to the WTO, "[R]evoking
a patent as a consequence of non-compliance with the disclosure
obligation would not benefit those who consider themselves to be
entitled to a share of the benefits of the inventions. Once patent
protection is revoked, there are no exclusive rights from which
benefits could be derived. '57 Quite to the contrary, "the issuing of a
patent could trigger benefit sharing. '' 58 As a result, the obligation to
disclose should be coupled with additional protective measures in
order to meet the goal of benefit sharing, 59 particularly in view of the
fact that such an approach has apparently been adopted with some
60
success in real cases.

56.
See infra Part III.A.2.
57.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement, the Convention on BiologicalDiversity and
the Protection of TraditionalKnowledge: Amending the TRIPS Agreement to Introduce
an Obligation to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and TraditionalKnowledge in
Patent Applications, 8, IP/C/W/473, (June 14, 2006) (containing the statement of
Norway).
58.
Morten Walloe Tvedt, Elements for Legislation in User Countries to Meet
the Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing Commitment, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 189,
197 (2006).
59.
See id. at 204 ("This information [about the origin of the genetic material]
will not necessarily convert into any distribution of benefits.... Therefore, disclosure
requirements of any kind must be paired with enforcement mechanisms to be a
successful strategy.").
60.
See ANIL K. GUPTA, WIPO-UNEP STUDY ON THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SHARING OF BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL
RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 156 (2004), available at

http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/publications/769e-unep-tk.pdf.
Without the protection[by patent] sought and obtained in the second and third
case studies, the technology would not have been licensed for potential
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It is important to emphasize that judicial proceedings for the
purpose of obtaining the cancellation of patents issued in spite of the
misappropriation
of traditional knowledge would be quite
burdensome for communities, should they wish to initiate such
actions. It is a well-known and unfortunate fact that litigation in
general, and patent litigation in particular, is quite costly.6 1 As a
result, should patents for the same invention be granted in different
countries (for example, if filed on the basis of a centralized patent
filing system such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty), 62 separate
patent cancellation proceedings would have to be initiated in each of
the relevant countries or regional areas, such as the region subject to
the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention). 63
Communities would consequently incur quite
substantial costs--costs they cannot reasonably be expected to incur
in order to litigate against the owners of patents that have been
improperly registered in different countries. 64 From this perspective,
the sanction of patent cancellation does not appear an appropriate
means of protecting communities.
One might, therefore, conclude that the obligation to disclose and
the use of punitive measures, such as criminal sanctions and the
cancellation of patents in case of a violation of the obligation to
disclose, do not generally offer an efficient guarantee of benefit

commercial exploitation and thus benefits would not have been obtained and
shared. To this extent, the use of existing patent laws enabled the generation
and sharing of benefits.

Id.
61.
More generally, from an economic perspective, the present patent system is
considered to unduly favor patent owners over third-party litigants. Indeed, patent
owners are likely to incur lesser costs than third parties challenging the validity of a
patent. Julio R. Robledo, Strategic Patents and Asymmetric Litigation Costs as Entry
Deterrence Instruments, ECON. BULL., Jan. 12, 2005, at 2-3, available at
http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2O05/volumel5/ EB-04030005A.pdf.
62.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 4, June 19, 1970, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
63.
Such proceedings could be initiated if no central opposition has been filed
against the European patent, which can be done during a nine month time limit from
the publication of the grant of the European patent. See Convention on the Grant of
European Patents [European Patent Convention], art. 99, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270,
available
at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-textslhtml/epc/2000/e/mal.html
(entered into force Dec. 13, 2007 as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 2000); see also
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT
LITIGATION AGREEMENT [EPLA] ON LITIGATION OF EUROPEAN PATENTS 1 (2006),
available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylonIeponet.nsfI0/2D620982152DB51
7C12572A700433C61/$File/impact assessment 2006 02 v1_en.pdf
(discussing the
limitations of the purely national system of litigating patents in Europe).
64.
See Stephen A. Hansen, Intellectual Property and Traditional Ecological
Knowledge: Institutionally Globalized Biopiracy?, PROF. ETHICS REP., Summer 2002, at
1, 1-2, available at http://www.aaas.org/ spp/sfrl/per/per30.pdf (noting that the
"prohibitive costs of registering, maintaining and defending patents against
infringement" have the end effect of deterring holders of indigenous knowledge from
filing patent applications should they have wished to do so).
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sharing for communities. In that sense, the obligation to disclose
might not be sufficiently protective. As a result, it is appropriate to
discuss what "legal means" 65 should be made available to
communities in order "to provide remedies for traditional knowledge
holders in cases where the fair and equitable sharing of benefits...
66
has not occurred."

III. MOVING

FROM TRANSPARENCY TO BENEFIT SHARING

Based on the analysis in Part II, it appears that, in order to
enable communities better to share the benefits derived from the
exploitation of their traditional knowledge, it is necessary to move
beyond the obligation to disclose, which is essentially intended to
ensure the transparency of the patent application process. 67 From a
policy perspective, probably too much attention has been paid to the
obligation to disclose and not enough to benefit sharing. 68 As
accurately expressed by Emanuela Arezzo, "[E]ven if such measures
[i.e., the obligation to disclose] were adopted and indigenous people
were able to discover which patents are based on their
misappropriated property, there is little chance of ensuring proper
'69
compensation pursuant to CBD's principles.

65.
This terminology is taken from the Draft TK Principles, supra note 2,
annex, at 12, arts. 1(1), (3), which provides that "[tiraditional knowledge shall be
protected against misappropriation," whereby
legal means should be provided to prevent... false claims or assertions of
ownership or control over traditional knowledge, including acquiring, claiming
or asserting intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge-related
subject matter when those intellectual property rights are not validly held in
the light of that traditional knowledge and any conditions relating to its access.
Id. (emphasis added).
66.
Id. annex, art. 6(4).
67.
See de Carvalho, supra note 7, at 375 (noting that the obligation to disclose
provides "a record of inventions that were developed with the use of genetic resources
conserved in situ and/or traditional or indigenous knowledge").
68.
See Tvedt, supra note 58, at 207.
A dangerous strategy for developing countries is to put a too high a stake in the
disclosure requirements or in the certificate systems if they are not developed
as part of a total package of implementation of enforceable benefit-sharing
commitments upon the beneficiaries. The discussions in the WIPO and the
CBD indicate that there is too much of a focus on these tools, and too little
focus upon other more legally binding mechanisms. Countries must be aware
of the limits embedded in these strategies regarding the potential to create any

benefit sharing.
Id.
69.

Emanuela Arezzo, Struggling Around the "Natural"Divide: The Protection

of Tangible and IntangibleIndigenous Property,25 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 414
(2007).
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It might consequently be desirable to consider a paradigm shift,
from a punitive and defensive approach based on the threat of patent
cancellations and criminal sanctions in the case of a violation of the
obligation to disclose to a positive and proactive approach aimed at
ensuring that communities will truly benefit 70 from the exploitation
of traditional knowledge by third parties. 7 1 Lessons from the legal
protection of tangible cultural property might be instructive in
defining potential methods of ensuring benefit sharing.
After
considering the lessons of tangible cultural property law in Part III.A,
the Article will focus on the potential modalities of ensuring benefit
sharing at the level of substantive law in Part III.B and procedural
law in Part III.C.
A. Are There Lessons To Be Learned from the Legal Protectionof
Tangible CulturalProperty?
The protection of tangible cultural property differs by its very
nature from the protection of traditional knowledge. However, it is
worth considering whether some legal concepts which have been
developed for and applied to the protection of tangible cultural
property could be implemented by analogy in a benefit-sharing
system for the exploitation of traditional knowledge. 72 For this
purpose, several concepts drawn from the protection of tangible
cultural property will be presented in Part III.A. 1, and their potential
application by analogy will then be assessed in Part III.A.2.
1.

Relevant Aspects of the Legal Protection of Tangible Cultural
Property

Among the various international conventions protecting tangible
cultural property goods, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention), 73
signed in Rome on June 24, 1995, contains some features worth
discussing in the context of this Article. The UNIDROIT Convention
applies to international claims for the restitution of cultural objects
stolen or removed from the territory of a contracting state contrary to

70.
These benefits may be both monetary and non-monetary.
71.
See Arezzo, supra note 69, at 387-89 (showing the insufficiency of defensive
mechanisms).
72.
For an interdisciplinary approach between cultural property and
traditional knowledge (limited, however, to the issue of the definition of traditional
knowledge), see Sarah Harding, Defining Traditional Knowledge-Lessons from
Cultural Property, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 511 (2003).
73.
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,
June
24,
1995,
34 I.L.M.
1322,
available at http://www.unidroit.org/
english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.htm.
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its cultural heritage protection laws regulating the export of cultural
74
objects.
First, with regard to the restitution of stolen cultural objects, the
basic rule of the UNIDROIT Convention is that the possessor of such
objects shall return them. 75 A claim for restitution of a cultural object
is subject to time limitations, 76 which include specific and more
favorable rules for cultural objects that are part of a "public
''77
collection.
Pursuant to Article 3(7) of the UNIDROIT Convention, a public
collection is defined as
a group of inventoried or otherwise identified cultural objects owned by:
(a) a Contracting State; (b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting
State; (c) a religious institution in a Contracting State; or (d) an
institution that is established for an essentially cultural, educational or
scientific purpose in a Contracting State and is recognised in that State
78
as serving the public interest.

In addition, Article 3(8) provides that "a claim for restitution of a
sacred or communally important cultural object belonging to and used
by a tribal or indigenous community in a Contracting State as part of
that community's traditional or ritual use, shall be subject to the time
79
limitation applicable to public collections."
The UNIDROIT Convention also protects, to a certain extent, the
good faith possessor of a stolen cultural object by providing that
[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it shall be
entitled, at the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable
compensation provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought
reasonably to have known that the object was stolen and can prove that
80
it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object.

With respect to the measures to be taken by the possessor of a stolen
cultural object in order to be entitled to such payment by a showing of
good faith, Article 4(4) provides that

74.
Id. art. 1.
75.
Id. art. 3(1).
76.
See id. art. 3(3) ("Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a period
of three years from the time when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object
and the identity of its possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the
time of the theft.").
77.
See id. art. 3(4).
However, a claim for restitution of a cultural object forming an integral part of
an identified monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a public
collection, shall not be subject to time limitations other than a period of three
years from the time when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object
and the identity of its possessor.
Id.
78.
79.
80.

Id. art. 3(7).
Id. art. 3(8).
Id. art. 4(1).
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in determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard
shall be had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the
character of the parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted
any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any
other relevant information and documentation which it could
reasonably have obtained, and whether the possessor consulted
accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable person
81
would have taken in the circumstances.

Based on this provision, a good faith possessor can be protected
if-among other factors to be taken into account-he has consulted
"any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects" or
"accessible agencies."8 2 In such cases, the possessor may obtain "fair
and reasonable compensation" if required to return the stolen
83
cultural object to its legitimate owner.
Regarding the return of illegally exported cultural objects,
Article 5(3) of the UNIDROIT Convention provides that "the court or
other competent authority of the State addressed shall order the
return of an illegally exported cultural object if the requesting State
establishes that the removal of the object from its territory
significantly impairs one or more of the following interests," which
include "the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or
indigenous community. '8 4 It further provides for a similar system of
compensation of the good faith possessor of the cultural object 85 and
mentions that "[i]nstead of compensation, and in agreement with the
requesting State, the possessor required to return the cultural object
'8 6
to that State may decide ...to retain ownership of the object.
Finally, with respect to the mechanisms for dispute settlement,
Article 8(2) of the UNIDROIT Convention provides that litigating
parties may consensually choose a judicial or arbitration forum for
solving disputes relating to claims for recovering stolen or illegally
exported cultural property: "The parties may agree to submit the
87
dispute to any court or other competent authority or to arbitration.
2.

Are There Analogies to the Protection of Traditional Knowledge
from Misappropriation?

After surveying selected aspects of the protection of cultural
property goods under the UNIDROIT Convention, the question for
this Article is whether any of them may be applied by analogy in
order to protect traditional knowledge from misappropriation.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 4(4).
art. 4(1).
art. 5(3).
arts. 6(1)-(2).
arts. 6(3), (3)(a).
art. 8(2).
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The starting point of the analysis is the fact that the
misappropriation
of traditional
knowledge,
specifically the
unauthorized patenting of inventions which are derived from
traditional knowledge, can conceptually be compared to the
unauthorized traffic and export of cultural objects, to the extent that
the goal of legal protection in both cases is to ensure that legitimate
right holders recover control over their misappropriated goods,
whether traditional knowledge or cultural property. One might argue
that the position of the owner of a patent based on traditional
knowledge is more legitimate than that of someone in possession of a
stolen or illegally exported cultural property good. Indeed, the grant
of a patent presupposes an inventive activity that justifies the grant
of the exclusive right, whereas, by contrast, such creativity is lacking
in the context of the traffic and export of tangible cultural objects. In
any case, certain elements of the UNIDROIT Convention are of
interest in the context of the discussion of potential legal remedies for
the misappropriation of traditional knowledge in patent applications.
First, the UNIDROIT Convention provides heightened protection
for an object that belongs to a public collection or is a "sacred or
communally important cultural object belonging to and used by a
tribal or indigenous community in a Contracting State as part of that
community's traditional or ritual use."8 8 The justification for such
increased protection converges with the protection of traditional
knowledge, which also targets the traditional use of local resources.
With respect to the increased level of protection of cultural goods
belonging to public collections, this protection derives in particular
from the fact that these goods are inventoried or otherwise
identified.8 9
From the perspective of traditional knowledge, it could similarly
be expected that the level of protection against unauthorized
misappropriation should be increased with respect to knowledge for
which there exists some publicity.9 This raises the issue of the
potential role of databases and registries of traditional knowledge.
On this subject, Article 11(2) of the Draft TK Principles provides that
[i]n the interests of transparency, certainty and the conservation of
traditional knowledge, relevant national authorities may maintain
registers or other records of traditional knowledge, where appropriate
and subject to relevant policies, laws and procedures, and the needs
and aspirations of traditional knowledge holders. Such registers may
be associated with specific forms of protection, and should not
compromise the status of hitherto undisclosed traditional knowledge or

88.
Id. arts. 3(4), (7), (8).
89.
Id. art. 3(7).
90.
One aspect of the increased level of protection resulting from the publicity
of traditional knowledge is the fact that such disclosed knowledge would belong to the
prior art. This would potentially bar the patentability of inventions based on this
traditional knowledge for lack of novelty or non-obviousness.
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the interests of traditional knowledge holders in relation to undisclosed
91
elements of their knowledge.

These databases and registries could thus have an important
role to play in preventing the misappropriation of traditional
knowledge. 92 In the same way that an acquirer or possessor of a
cultural object under the UNIDROIT Convention is expected to
conduct due diligence by consulting relevant registries 93 to ensure
that a cultural object has not been reported as stolen, a company
wishing to file a patent application relating to traditional knowledge
should be required to check all available relevant registries and
databases.
The patent applicant could thereby gain greater
assurance that the invention that is the subject of a patent

application is not unduly derived from any traditional knowledge.
Even though such a requirement may impose a burden on patent
applicants and their agents, as well as on patent offices, the use of
databases and registries of traditional knowledge offers real
94
benefits.

However, the issue of broad access to databases and registries of
traditional knowledge is complex. Excessively broad access runs the
risk of facilitating the misappropriation of traditional knowledge
rather than protecting against it. 95 However, the identification of the
owner of traditional knowledge, which is necessary to allow benefit
sharing, would be made easier with the availability of such databases
96
and registries.
In this respect, the following passage highlights the similarity
between databases of lost tangible cultural property and those of
traditional knowledge; though the passage is addressed to lost

91.
Draft TKPrinciples,supra note 2, annex, at 39, art. 11(2).
92.
This is precisely the goal of the remarkable project of the Indian government
with
the
Traditional
Knowledge
Digital
Library,
http://www.tkdl.res.in/
tkdllLangDefaultcommonHome.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
93.
These registries include the databases of the Art Loss Register and of
INTERPOL. Art Loss Register, http://www.artloss.com (last visited Dec. 19, 2008);
INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.com/Public/WorkOfArt[Default.asp (last visited Dec.
19, 2008) (providing information on how INTERPOL combats the international stolen
art trade).
94.
One question relates to the accessibility of these databases to the patent
applicants. WIPO Intergovernmental IP Committee, Practical Mechanisms for the
Defensive Protection of TraditionalKnowledge and Genetic Resources Within the Patent
System, 6, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/6 (May 14, 2003).
95.
Dutfield, supra note 35, at 927-28. See generally Thomas J. Krumenacher,
Comment, Protectionfor Indigenous Peoples and Their TraditionalKnowledge: Would a
Registry System Reduce the Misappropriation of Traditional Knowledge?, 8 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 152-55 (2004) (examining current efforts to reduce the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge).
96.
See Tvedt, supra note 58, at 202 (discussing the existence of "credible
information" on the provider or origin of the genetic resources).

164

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 42:143

tangible cultural property, it speaks just as well by analogy to
databases of traditional knowledge:
Access is therefore a double-edged sword.
The publication of
inventories on the Internet makes it very easy for potential thieves to
browse and make their shopping lists. It makes insiders of outsiders.
On the other hand, the Internet can offer a very good support in the
97
recovery of stolen objects.

In spite of these similarities, databases of traditional knowledge
raise additional questions in connection with the issue of traditional
knowledge as prior art. 98 In order to avoid any misuse of databases
and registries of traditional knowledge, these databases and
registries could be made accessible only to specific national or
international entities, which would be bound by a duty of secrecy with
respect to the content of the databases, and not directly to potential
patent applicants. Patent applicants would then be obliged to consult
these "accessible agencies" 99 as part of their due diligence.
Applicants would submit their patent applications to these
independent agencies, which would then check whether the
applications related to or contained traditional knowledge. They
could then inform the patent applicants of the presence or absence of
traditional knowledge without disclosing to them the full content of
the searched databases or the full results of their searches. Under
this approach, patent applicants would not have an opportunity to
misappropriate traditional knowledge by accessing privileged data to
which the agencies would have privileged access.
Under the UNIDROIT Convention, when a possessor of a stolen
cultural object has demonstrated good faith by performing due
diligence when acquiring the object, the possessor may be financially
compensated in exchange for returning the cultural object. 10 0 By
analogy, a good faith patent applicant, as evidenced by the
performance of due diligence by the patent applicant, should receive
lesser sanctions if it appears at a later date that his invention was

97.
Ton Cremers, Theft, the Internet and Museum Objects: Threats and
Opportunities, ICOM
NEWS,
No.
4,
2006,
at
4,
available
at
http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/icompdf/E-news2006/p4-2006-4.pdf.
98.
See UNU-IAS, THE ROLE OF REGISTERS AND DATABASES IN THE PROTECTION
OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 38 (2004), available at
http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries/UNUIASTKRegistersReport.pdf.
Databases can play an important role in defensive protection of TK. However,
existing law and policy regarding sources of prior art is insensitive to the
nature of TK, its confidentiality, and the rights and interests of indigenous
peoples over its future uses. Requiring that TK be placed in the public domain
as a condition for recognising it as prior art is a double-edged sword.

Id.
99.
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,
supra note 73, art. 4(4).
100.
Id. art. 4(1).
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based on traditional knowledge. For example, it could be difficult for
patent applicants to trace the origins of genetic resources. 1° 1 As a
result, the patent owner might have legitimate interests to consider
when deciding on the modalities of benefit sharing.
This is
particularly true in the case of owners to whom a patent has been
transferred and who, consequently, cannot be blamed for violating the
obligation to disclose at the time of filing the patent application. The
legitimate interests of such patent owners may deserve some
protection should the patent at issue involve a misappropriation of
10 2
traditional knowledge.
However, the protection of such good faith patent owners by
analogy to the good faith possessor of a cultural object should in no
way constitute an absolute shield that would prevent the protection of
communities against the misappropriation of their traditional
knowledge, unless the communities at issue allow the patent holder
to keep the benefits from the patent. Such an agreement is analogous
to the ability of the possessor of an illegally exported cultural good to
retain ownership of the object with the agreement of the state from
which the object was illegally exported, under Article 7(3) of the
UNIDROIT Convention. 1° 3 As a result, the fact that a patent owner
has legitimate reasons for not having identified the traditional
knowledge in the patented invention and, thus, has not disclosed it in
the course of the application process would not bar granting
communities certain rights 1° 4 as to the patented invention.
Finally, the UNIDROIT Convention also offers to the parties the
ability to solve their disputes by recourse to alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, specifically by arbitration. Arbitration as a
method of dispute resolution can and should be encouraged with
regard to disputes arising from cases of misappropriation of
05
traditional knowledge.'
Several valuable concepts from the law governing the protection
of tangible cultural property could help shape an appropriate system
of protection against the misappropriation of traditional knowledge.
The next question is how such protection should be implemented in
order to ensure true benefit sharing.

101.
de Carvalho, supra note 35, at 186.
102.
This raises the issue of the flexibility of the sanctions to be imposed in a
particular case. See infra Part III.C.2.
103.
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,
supra note 73, art. 6(3).
104.
The potential nature and extent of these rights are discussed below. See
infra Part III.B.
105.
See infra Part III.C.1.
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B. PotentialModalities for SharingBenefits with the Communities
Various solutions have been discussed at the international
level 0 6 and adopted at the national level 10 7 in order to promote the
sharing of benefits resulting from the use of traditional knowledge.
In spite of the differences between these regimes, benefit sharing
should in all cases include both monetary and non-monetary 10
elements, as emphasized in the Bonn Guidelines; historically, nonmonetary elements have not always been sufficiently taken into
account, in spite of efforts to raise awareness about them. 0 9
Among the potential modalities for benefit sharing, the coownership of patents is frequently suggested.' 1 0 Consequently, it is

106.
See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 44, annex,
1-61 (establishing
international guidelines on access and benefit sharing); see also WIPO
Intergovernmental IP Committee, Draft Guidelines on Access and Benefit Sharing
Regardingthe Utilisation of Genetic Resources, annex, at 5, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/9 (Apr.
27, 2001),
available at http:lwww.wipo.intledocslmdocs/tk/en/wipo-grtkf-ic-l/
wipogrtkf ic _9.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines] (containing the
document submitted by the Government of Switzerland).
107.
E.g., The Biological Diversity Act, No. 5 of 2002, India Code (2003), ch. 5, §
21, available at http://www.nbaindia.org/act/act-english.htm (requiring equitable
benefit sharing); Biological Diversity Rules, 2004, 49 Gen. S. R. & 0. 261, R. 20 (India),
available at http://www.nbaindia.org/rules.htm (implementing, inter alia, Section 21 of
the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 by setting up the criteria for equitable benefit
sharing).
108.
See CBD, supra note 39, arts. 16(3), 19(1)-(2) (referring to non-monetary
benefit sharing in terms of transfer of technology to the countries providing genetic
resources).
109.
See SARAH LAIRD & RACHEL WYNBERG, SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN PRACTICE: TRENDS IN
PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS SECTORS 31 (2008) [hereinafter ABS IN PRACTICE: TRENDS IN
PARTNERSHIPS], available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/ publications/cbd-ts-38-en.pdf. The
report notes:
For many companies, in particular those in the pharmaceutical industry, a
package of monetary and non-monetary benefits associated with bioprospecting
is now standard practice. There is concern within industry, however, that the
most significant benefits-training, technology transfer, and capacitybuilding-are de-emphasized in relation to future royalties, which are unlikely
to materialize [ref. omitted]. As Frank Petersen of Novartis said (pers. comm.,
2007): "Capacity-building opportunities and mechanisms meant to anchor
knowledge within the bioprospecting partner group-beyond the expiration
date of a cooperation-are clearly at a disadvantage compared to the emphasis
on royalties. We have to be aware that in the vast majority of natural productsbased drug discovery efforts, no royalties can be generated given the low
probability of a market introduction. In our discussions with potential
bioprospecting partners, we flexibly balance royalty aspects with training
opportunities, know-how or technology transfer, supply of special equipment,
and invitations for scientists to work with us in Basel according to the specific
needs of the partner institute."
Id.
110.
See Biological Diversity Act, No. 5 of 2002, ch. 5, § 21(2)(a) (listing the
"grant of joint ownership of intellectual property rights to the National Biodiversity
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necessary to assess the appropriateness of this solution.'1 ' In view of
the drawbacks of a co-ownership regime as described in Part III.B.1,
the question addressed in Part III.B.2 is whether another regime for
benefit sharing, potentially based on a compulsory licensing system,
112
should be encouraged.
1.

Co-Ownership of Patents

The proposal that communities receive co-ownership of the
patents using their traditional knowledge has been suggested in the
Bonn Guidelines 113 and has also been discussed in the legal
literature. 114 As a matter of principle, one potential advantage of the
co-ownership regime is that it would allow straightforward sharing of
both monetary and non-monetary benefits. As co-owners of the
relevant patents, communities would be generally entitled to derive
financial benefits from this status, as well as potentially nonfinancial,
technological benefits, particularly as a result of information
exchanges with their co-owners. 115
However, one might ask on what principle the communities
deserve co-ownership of the patented invention. A claim of coownership would only be justified if the co-owner had actively
participated in the creation of the patented invention. In a situation
in which a patent is derived from preexisting traditional knowledge,
it is uncertain that the owner or creator of the underlying traditional
knowledge could, in all circumstances, legitimately claim to be the coinventor of the patented invention.
Irrespective of this issue, the status of co-ownership raises the
difficult question of how to define the persons or entities which should
be considered as co-owners. 116 This key issue, however, is not limited
to the specific case of the potential co-ownership of patents, but arises
generally in the debate surrounding the protection of traditional

Authority, or where benefit claimers are identified, to such benefit claimers" as the

first available option); WTO Interpretationof Relationship Between TRIPS and CBD,
supra note 15,
14 ("Where the failure to provide evidence of benefit-sharing is
discovered after the grant of a patent, the legal effect could include ... [flull or partial
transfer of the rights to the invention, also as an alternative to revocation, as a means
of promoting fair and equitable benefit-sharing .....
111.
See infra Part III.B.1.
112.
See infra Part III.B.2.
113.
See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 44, app. II,
1(j), 2(q) (listing joint
ownership in the monetary and nonmonetary benefits lists).

114.

Maggie Kohls, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling Biopiracy, 6

CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 108, 122 (2007).
115.
This double aspect of the regime of co-ownership may explain why the joint
ownership of intellectual property rights is listed in the Bonn Guidelines both as a
monetary and as a nonmonetary benefit. Bonn Guidelines, supra note 44, app. II,
1(j), 2(q).
116.
Kohls, supra note 114, at 123.
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knowledge. As a result, uncertainty regarding the definition of the
persons or entities to be treated as co-owners should not, in and of
itself, block the adoption of a co-ownership model.
Even though co-ownership over a patent is generally understood
as giving co-owners the right to share the benefits derived from its
commercial exploitation, co-ownership also means sharing the
associated costs. 1 1 7 These costs relate first to the prosecution and
maintenance of the patent, but they also cover the potential costs of
its judicial enforcement or, more generally, of any patent litigation,
1 18
including patent cancellation proceedings. As already emphasized,
these costs can be quite substantial. From this perspective, coownership may not be the most favorable system of benefit sharing
for communities.
Co-owners of intellectual property rights may be free to allocate
the profits and losses between them contractually, so that a
community might obtain only profits without having to share the
costs of filing, maintaining, and enforcing the patent--costs which
would be borne exclusively by its industrial partner. However, it is
somewhat unlikely that communities would be in a position to claim
co-ownership of patents and obtain only the benefits from such coownership without bearing at least a fraction of the relevant costs. In
addition, it is uncertain that such contractual agreements would
protect communities against third parties that wished to sue all coowners of the-relevant patent in the course of patent infringement or
patent cancellation proceedings, particularly as a result of mandatory
rules of civil procedure making it compulsory that all co-owners be
sued. 119
Furthermore, co-ownership of intellectual property rights is
frequently difficult to manage, particularly internationally. 120 The
legal rules defining the respective rights and obligations of co-owners
may diverge widely at the national level. This means, assuming that
a regime of co-ownership were to exist with respect to national

117.

See ABS IN PRACTICE: TRENDS IN PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 109, at 33.

[T]hose wishing to share in the intellectual property from a successful
development must be prepared to make a significant financial investment to
share the risk of failure, but such investments are often beyond the reach of
many providing institutions. Joint ownership of patents by providers and users
is thus complex, rare, and expensive, although examples exist.
Id.
118.
See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
119.
FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The
Elusive Logic of the Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV
1323, 1336-80 (2000) (explaining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the standing
doctrine as they apply to intellectual property law).
120.
Thierry J. Calame & Jacques de Werra, Co-titularit6des droits de proprigtg
intellectuelle (tout particulirementdes brevets) dans le cadre de projets de recherche et
dveloppement conjoints: un pi~ge & 9viter?, ANWALTSREVUE, Aug. 1, 2003, at 10.
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patents issued in various countries, that the respective rights and
obligations of the co-owners might be different in each of these
countries. In some countries, a co-owner might validly use and
license the patented invention for use by third-party licensees while
keeping the profits thus generated, without having to share them
with another co-owner. 121 In other countries, national patent
regulations might prevent such actions. 122 This discrepancy between
national patent regimes and the resulting legal uncertainty would
obviously be detrimental to the interests of the co-owners, specifically
communities.
Even though co-owners might attempt to address some of these
issues by way of contractual provisions, such contractual solutions
will not solve all issues. This is particularly true with respect to
mandatory principles of civil procedure that require that all coowners be named as parties to litigation. 123 It is likely that
communities will still risk facing some liabilities as co-owners of
patents.
As a result of these features and potential liabilities resulting
from co-ownership over patents, the regime based on co-ownership
would not effectively reach the goal of benefit sharing for
communities.
2.

Compulsory Licensing
Knowledge?

Scheme for the Use of Traditional

As noted above, 124 communities may not have an interest in
obtaining the cancellation of a patent covering an invention that
unduly misappropriated traditional knowledge. They might rather
have an interest in keeping such patents alive in order to share in the
potential benefits that could result from their commercial
exploitation. It might be in a community's best interest to prevent
the owner of relevant, preexisting traditional knowledge from
blocking the exploitation of a potentially valuable patent. On this

121.

This is the case under U.S. patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2008).

In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a
patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the
Unites States, or import the patented invention into the United States without
the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.
Id.
This is, for instance, the case under Swiss patent law. See Recueil
122.
Syst~matique, Loi f~d~rale sur les brevets d'invention [LBI] [Federal Law for Patents
on Inventions], June 25, 1954, R.S. 232.14, art. 34, 2 (1995) (Switz.) ("Where a patent
application or the patent itself is owned by several persons, a license may not be
granted without the consent of all co-owners.").
123.

FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).

124.

See supratext accompanying notes 57-58.
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basis, scholars have suggested a compensatory liability regime rather
than the recognition of exclusive property rights for communities.
Such a regime might indeed "entitle indigenous people to procure
compensation from third party exploitation; however, it would not
1 25
grant them the right to block access to third parties.'
For the purpose of such a scheme, Article 31(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement, which defines the status of dependent patents, could be
applied by analogy. 126
With regard to protection from the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge, the status of communities
is similar to that of owners of a preexisting patent. The latter may
have to tolerate the commercial exploitation of a subsequent patent
(i.e., the patent unduly incorporating a community's traditional
knowledge), provided that the new patent "involve[s] an important
technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to
the invention claimed in the first patent"; 127 that communities "be
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the authorization"; 128 and that
communities are "entitled to a cross-license on reasonable terms to
use the invention claimed in the second patent,"'1 29 among the other
conditions set forth under Article 31.
Such a compulsory license scheme could thus offer an
appropriate legal framework under which the validity of a patent
incorporating traditional knowledge would not be threatened, thus
protecting a patent from cancellation that would not deny benefits to
the relevant community. At the same time, the exploitation of such a
patent would still be subject to the authorization of a court and to the
payment to the community of compensation to be fixed, or at least
reviewed, by an independent authority. 130 Such a proposal could
allow the sharing of benefits with communities, both at the financial

125.
Arezzo, supra note 69, at 391-92 (presenting and discussing the proposal of
Jerome H. Reichman and Tracy Lewison a compensatory liability regime); see also
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local

Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337, 354-55 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005) (discussing compensatory liability rules and their application to
traditional knowledge).
126.
Arezzo, supra note 69, at 391 n.111; see also Gustavo Ghidini & Emanuela

Arezzo, Patent and Copyright Paradigms vis-d-vis Derivative Innovation: The Case of
Computer Programs, 36 INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 159, 162-63

(2005) (proposing a new liability regime for computer programs).
127.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 310)(i).
128.
Id. art. 31(h).
129.
Id. art. 31(l)(ii).
130.
See id. art. 31(j) ("[A]ny decision relating to the remuneration provided in
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review by a
distinct higher authority in that Member.").
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and technological levels, as a result of the patent owners granting a
cross-license.
This approach is quite promising, even though it would require
some adaptations in order to address more effectively the issue of the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge. This need for adaptation
particularly relates to the matter of the triggering event necessary for
granting a compulsory license. In the system of dependent patents
under Article 31()(i) of the TRIPS Agreement, the new patent must
"involve an important technical advance of considerable economic
in
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent"
131
order to receive a compulsory license on the pre-existing patent.
How should this requirement be adapted to the case of
misappropriation of traditional knowledge? As a matter of principle,
it may appear inappropriate to refer to the "considerable economic
significance" of the patent as the relevant criterion, given that the
132
This
economic significance covers only monetary benefit sharing.
approach would not address non-monetary benefits, the protections of
which is essential for potential legal remedies against the
Similarly, the mere
misappropriation of traditional knowledge.
ability to grant financial remuneration and a cross-license to a
community, as set forth under Article 31(1) of the TRIPS Agreement,
may not sufficiently reflect the broad range of monetary and, more
importantly, non-monetary benefits that communities might obtain in
This system would
the context of a benefit sharing system.
but it stands
and
fine-tuned,
adapted
further
to
be
need
consequently
sharing.
benefit
encourage
to
approach
out as a promising
C. Implementation of the Benefit Sharing System
Communities need more than just rules providing for benefit
sharing at the level of substantive law; they also need an effective
enforcement system. Thus, in a paragraph entitled "Principle of
Effectiveness and Accessibility of Protection," the Draft TK Principles
provide that
[m]easures for protecting traditional knowledge should be effective in
achieving the objectives of protection, and should be understandable,
affordable, accessible and not burdensome for their intended
beneficiaries, taking account of the cultural, social and economic
context of traditional knowledge holders. Where measures for the
protection of traditional knowledge are adopted, appropriate
enforcement mechanisms should be developed permitting effective

131.
132.

Id. art. 31(1)(i).
Id.
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A similar concern was also expressed in the context of the CBD,
'134
which identified the need to ensure "access to justice.
The practical implementation of an efficient benefit sharing
system requires an effective enforcement and dispute resolution
mechanism 135 as well as a flexible approach in the design of the
l3 6
available remedies.
1.

Efficient Enforcement and Dispute Resolution System

It is widely acknowledged that a solution to the problem of the
misappropriation of traditional knowledge should be found at the
international level, in order to cover the countries from which

133.
Draft TK Principles, supra note 2, annex, at 8 (listing general guiding
principles).
134.
"Access to justice" was identified in the context of the creation of an
international regime on access and benefit-sharing. See Conference of the Parties
[COP],
COP 8 Decision VIII/4:
Access
and
benefit-sharing, annex,
UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31
(Mar. 20-31,
2006), available at http://www.cbd.int/
decisions/cop-08.shtml?m=COP-08&id=11016&lg=O (providing, under a specific chapter
entitled "Access to justice," "[m]easures to [facilitate] [ensure] access to justice and
redress" and "[m]easures to [guarantee and] facilitate access to justice and redress,
including administrative and judicial remedies, as well as alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms [by providers and users]"). More recently, the COP has decided
to appoint an expert group in order to address this issue. See COP, COP 9 Decision
IX/12: Access and benefit sharing, annex II, (May 19-31, 2008), available
at http://www.cbd.int/decisions/?m=COP-09&id=11655&lg=O. The COP provides that:
A group of technical and legal experts on compliance is established to further
examine the issue of compliance in order to assist the Working Group on Access
and Benefit sharing. The expert group shall provide legal and, as appropriate,
technical advice, including, where appropriate, options and/or scenarios. The
expert group will address the following questions:
(a) What kind of measures are available, or could be developed, in public and
private international law to:
(i) Facilitate, with particular consideration to fairness and equity, and taking
into account cost and effectiveness:
a) Access to justice, including alternative dispute resolution;
b) Access to courts by foreign plaintiffs;
(ii) Support mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments across
jurisdictions; and
(iii) Provide remedies and sanctions in civil, commercial and criminal matters;
in order to ensure compliance with national access and benefit-sharing
legislation and requirements, including prior informed consent, and mutually
agreed terms.
Id. annex II, sec. A(1)(a).
135.
See infra Part III.C.1.
136.
See infra Part III.C.2.
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traditional knowledge has been unduly "exported," as well as
importing countries where traditional knowledge has been
commercially used and patented. 137 However, relatively little
attention has been paid to the ways in which one might settle
disputes arising from cases of misappropriation of traditional
knowledge in patent applications. 138
Various enforcement
mechanisms adopted in existing patent law instruments might be
applied by analogy to effectuate the efficient enforcement of
protection against the misappropriation of traditional knowledge and
to ensure access to justice for communities.
Under the European Patent Convention, a claim raised by a
third party challenging the entitlement of the patent applicant to the
invention may lead to a stay of the patent application proceedings.
Rule 14(1) of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the
Grant of European Patents (EPC Implementing Regulations) states:
If a third party provides evidence that he has instituted proceedings
against the applicant seeking a decision within the meaning of Article
61, paragraph 1, the proceedings for grant shall be stayed unless the
third party communicates to the European Patent Office in writing his
consent to the continuation of such proceedings. Such consent shall be
irrevocable. However, proceedings for grant shall not be stayed before
13 9
the publication of the European patent application.

This system of staying patent application proceedings might also be
used in the context of protection against the misappropriation of
traditional knowledge. A stay of patent application proceedings
would be imposed if a community were to initiate a legal action
against the patent applicant in order to try to obtain some benefit
sharing on the patent at issue.
This system could work to
communities' advantage by putting pressure on patent applicants to
find a solution to disputes-given that patent applications would not
be processed until they had been solved-without threatening the
validity of the patents. If an agreement with the relevant community
were reached, the patent could be granted (provided, of course, that
the conditions of patentability were met).
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the efficient
enforcement of communities' rights would require setting up

137.
Hoare & Tarasofsky, supranote 51, at 159.
138.
Some commentators consider the existing international dispute resolution
system sufficient for this purpose. Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal
Perspectives on TraditionalKnowledge: The Case for Intellectual PropertyProtection, 7
J. INT'L ECON. L. 371, 399 (2004); see also Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 51, at 163
(confirming that it is very difficult to challenge a patent which has been granted in a
foreign jurisdiction in violation of the principles of the CBD).
139.
Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European
Patents, R.14(1) (Oct. 5, 1973), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/lawlegaltextslhtmllepc/2000/e/ma2.html (as adopted by Decision of the Administrative Council
of the European Patent Organisation of Dec. 7, 2006).
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specialized courts or other dispute resolution authorities for the
purpose of allowing quick and, ideally, inexpensive resolutions of
disputes. The European Patent Convention provides for exclusive
fora for litigating the rights of claimants on a disputed European
patent. The exclusive jurisdiction of these specialized courts, subject
to exceptions defined on the basis of the place of residence or place of
business of the parties, involves claims relating to the entitlement to
a patent under the Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of
Decisions in Respect of the Right to the Grant of a European Patent
140
(Protocol on Recognition).
By analogy, special patent courts could be entrusted with the
exclusive task of deciding disputes regarding the misappropriation of
traditional knowledge. The exclusive jurisdiction of these courts,
which could be instituted at the national level or, preferably, at the
international level, 141 might avoid the costs and hassles that would
otherwise be incurred in initiating separate legal actions in each and
every country in which a disputed patent application had been filed
or granted. In the absence of specialized courts, this strictly local
approach would be necessary because of the principle of territoriality
that governs patent law-i.e., that each nation has the sovereign
142
power to make decisions regarding its own national patents.
Another potential approach would be to resolve these cases using
arbitration-a well-established method of solving international
disputes.' 43 Arbitration is mentioned in Article 27(3)(a) and Part 1 of
44
Annex II of the CBD, as well as in other CBD-related documents.'

140.
EPC, Protocolon Jurisdictionand the Recognition of Decisions in Respect of
the Right to the Grant of a European Patent (Protocol on Recognition), § 1, (Oct. 5,
1973), available at http://www.epo.org/patentsflaw/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/
ma4.html.
141.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Towards an International Framework for the
Protection of Traditional Knowledge 15 (paper presented at UNCTAD-Commonwealth
Secretariat workshop on the Elements of National Sui Generis Systems for the
Preservation, Protection and Promotion of Traditional Knowledge: Innovations and
Practices and Options for an International Framework, Geneva, Switzerland), available
at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1024&context=graeme-dinwoodie
(considering that an "international institution could be authorized to make
determinations regarding traditional knowledge claims").
142.
See id. at 11-12 (referring to the derogation of territoriality as "unsettling"
for many countries).
143.
See International Centre for Dispute Resolution, http://www.adr.org/icdr
(last visited Dec. 19, 2008) (noting that the international business community is
increasingly using arbitration to resolve disputes and providing information on
international arbitration rules).
144.
COP, COP 7 Decision VII/19: Access and benefit-sharing as related to
genetic resources (Article 15), pt. D, Annex, sec. (d)(xxi), UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (Feb. 920,
2004),
available
at
http://www.cbd.int/decisions/cop-07.shtml?m=COP07&id=7756&lg=0 (mentioning that disputes can be solved by "dispute settlement
and/or arbitration," which constitutes a somewhat unclear formulation, given that
arbitration is a method of dispute settlement so that the terms "and/or" which are used
in this provision may not reflect the real nature of arbitration).
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Furthermore, the use of arbitration has gained significant momentum
in intellectual property-related disputes, as confirmed by the expert
services and documents provided by the WIPO Arbitration and
145
Mediation Center in this field.
However, the use of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution
requires an arbitration agreement between the parties, which might
not be easy to obtain in all cases. Such an agreement could
potentially be reached by obligating all patent applicants, including
those having misappropriated traditional knowledge, to submit to the
jurisdiction of specific courts in the course of the patent application
process. Patent applicants could be obliged at the time of filing to
accept that any claim potentially raised by communities against them
on the basis of an alleged misappropriation of traditional knowledge
should be arbitrated or litigated before a specific court, based on a
specific dispute resolution system.
A similar system has been successfully implemented quasiglobally for so-called cybersquatting cases that result from the
misappropriation of Internet domain names. 146 Under this system,
registrants of domain names are required, in the terms and
conditions of the domain name registrars upon registering a domain
name, to submit to administrative proceedings that can be initiated
against them at a later time by trademark owners attempting to
obtain the transfer or cancellation of the disputed domain name
under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP) 147 or other similar policies. 148 The implementation by
analogy of such a system in the international patent arena could be
achieved by imposing a similar obligation on persons and bodies filing
international patent applications in the PCT Regulations, or on those
filing European patent applications in the EPC Implementing
Regulations.
Beyond these relatively formal dispute resolution systems, more
flexible and informal dispute resolution-mechanisms, such as
mediation, may perhaps constitute the best approach for solving
14 9
disputes relating to the misappropriation of traditional knowledge.

145.
See Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A
TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 165 (referencing the fact
that WIPO has a dispute resolution mechanism for intellectual property issues).
146.
For a discussion about such a potential analogy and limits thereto, see
Dinwoodie, supra note 141, at 15-16.
147.
See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers [ICANN],
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
4 (Oct. 24, 1999), available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
148.
On Internet domain name disputes, see WIPO, Domain Name Dispute
Resolution, http://www.wipo.intlamc/en/domains/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008), for the
dedicated website of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center.
149.
See J. Christian Wichard & Wend B. Wendland, Mediation as an Option for
Resolving Disputes Between Indigenous/Traditional Communities and Industry
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Indeed, the Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines recommended mediation for
negotiating fair and equitable benefit sharing agreements regarding
the use of traditional knowledge, 150 as did the CBD for resolving
disputes between contracting parties to the CBD. 15 1
Finally, it is also essential that any dispute-settlement
mechanisms not only address the disputes between communities and
patent applicants or patent owners but also cover potential disputes
between communities themselves, in cases where they shall raise
competing claims on the same traditional knowledge. 152 For the sake
of efficiency, all disputes relating to an alleged case of
misappropriation of traditional knowledge in a patent application
process should ideally be solved in one forum, in one proceeding.
2.

Flexible Approach

In view of the widely diverging interests of stakeholders,
specifically the victims of misappropriation of traditional knowledge,
it would be counterproductive to establish rigid methods and

Concerning TraditionalKnowledge, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 475, 475 (Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (exploring the use of mediation as a
method of resolving disputes over traditional knowledge).
150.
See Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines, supranote 106, which provides that:
15.1. The stakeholders involved in a transaction of genetic resources are
encouraged to seek support by a mediator when negotiating the mutually
agreed terms as referred to in Articles 7 and 8 [which respectively regulate the
responsibilities during the process of scientific research and development and
regarding the findings of scientific research and development and the transfer
of technology] of the Guidelines.
15.2. The mediator shall facilitate the negotiations of mutually agreed terms
between the stakeholders involved in a transaction of genetic resources with
the aim of obtaining a balanced outcome for such stakeholders.
Id. art 15.
The "mediator" is defined as "any entity which is independent from stakeholders
and acts as trustworthy facilitator in the negotiations of the mutually agreed terms of a
transaction of genetic resources." Id. art. 2.1. However, the Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines
do not specify how the mediator shall be appointed or how the mediation proceedings
shall be organized, which is not optimal and could be solved by referring to existing
mediation rules, such as the WIPO mediation rules. WIPO ARBITRATION AND
MEDICATION CENTER, WIPO ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES (2008), available at

http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/mediation/ rules.
151.

See CBD, supra note 39.

(1) In the event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall
seek solution by negotiation.
(2) If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation, they may
jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third party.
Id. arts. 27(1)-(2).
152.
Gervais, supra note 145, at 165.
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sanctions for solving all resulting legal issues. This recommends the
policy, discussed above in Part III.C.1, of adopting flexible dispute
153
resolution systems, such as mediation.
In other words, there is not and cannot be a single solution. Any
and all acts of misappropriation of traditional knowledge should not
automatically lead to the same sanction. To the contrary, a balanced
and flexible approach is required in order to better reflect the specific
interests of the relevant stakeholders. 154 This flexibility is essential
in view of the fact that victims of misappropriation of traditional
knowledge have different views on the potential methods to cure or
solve the violation of their interests.' 5 5 While some consider that
their resources are sacred and should remain secret, so that no
patents should be granted at all, 1 56 others believe that indigenous
communities should obtain equitable benefit sharing in the profits
generated from the exploitation of their resources resulting from a
patent.157

The Bonn Guidelines expressly mention this flexibility in
Paragraph 49: "Mechanisms for benefit-sharing may vary depending
upon the type of benefits, the specific conditions in the country and
the stakeholders involved. The benefit-sharing mechanism should be
flexible as it should be determined by the partners involved in
benefit-sharing and will vary on a case-by-case basis." '58 This
flexibility is also reflected in the Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines. 159

153.
See supratext accompanying notes 149-51.
154.
See Christoph Beat Graber & Martin A. Girsberger, TraditionalKnowledge
at the InternationalLevel: Current Approaches and Proposalsfor a Bigger Picture that
Includes Cultural Diversity, in RECHT DES LANDLICHEN RAUMS: FESTGABE FOR PAUL
RICHLI ZUM 60 GEBURTSTAG 243, 265-66 (Jorg Schmid & Hansjorg Seiler eds., 2006)
(acknowledging that there cannot be a "one size fits all" solution); see also ABS IN
PRACTIcE: TRENDS IN PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 109, at 130 (listing among the
recommendations for providers of genetic resources and of traditional knowledge to
"[a]void a 'one-size fits all' approach to ABS measures, taking into account the diversity
in user industries, including differences in research and development, the value of
genetic resources to industry R&D, the types of commercial products that result, and
the profitability of products").
155.
Kohls, supra note 114, at 110.
156.
See id. (referring to this group as the "romantic bio-opponents").
157.
Id.; see also Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore and Indigenous
Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997) (noting
the potential differences of views of local communities).
158.
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 44, 49 (emphasis added).
159.
See Swiss Draft ABS Guidelines, supra note 106.
When determining the mode for the sharing of benefits arising from the
commercialisation and other utilisation of genetic resources, the short, medium
and long term interests of all stakeholders involved shall be considered.
Furthermore, some modes of benefit sharing may become effective
immediately, whereas others become effective only in the distant future due to
the period of time needed for the benefits to arise. Additionally, benefit sharing
can be awarded not only in monetary, but also in non-monetary forms. Finally,
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iV. CONCLUSION

The goal of this Article has been to discuss whether the
obligation to disclose effectively protects communities. As was noted,
this obligation may not be sufficient, as it merely creates
transparency in the patent application process but does not directly
Therefore, additional
ensure benefit sharing for communities.
protective measures must be implemented in order to turn benefit
sharing into reality. For this purpose, different legal approaches may
be considered, including approaches derived from other legal fields,
In addition to
such as the law of tangible cultural property.
substantive legal measures, the practical enforcement of the claims of
communities must not be ignored. To this end, issues of access to
justice and efficient dispute resolution methods deserve attention.
Without enforcement mechanisms, communities cannot avail
themselves of substantive protections against the misappropriation of
their traditional knowledge.
However, the misappropriation of traditional knowledge is not
limited to cases of its unauthorized use in inventions for which patent
Unauthorized use of traditional
protection has been sought.

when determining the mode of benefit sharing, the involved stakeholders are
encouraged to consider the suitability of any existing institution, mechanism or
facility.
Possible elements for the mutually agreed terms regarding the sharing of
benefits arising from the commercialisation and other utilisation of genetic
resources, as referred to in Article 8.2 of the Guidelines, include, inter alia:
Transfer of knowledge and technology, in particular knowledge and
technology that make use of genetic resources, including biotechnology, or
that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable utilisation of
biological diversity.
Collaboration in education and training;
Collaboration in scientific research and development programs;
Participation in product development;
Joint ventures;
Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;
Joint ownership of patents and other relevant forms of intellectual
property rights;
Providing means for a fund at the local, national, regional or multilateral
level;
Fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired;
Licence fee in case of commercialisation;
Royalties;
Trust Funds.
Id. annex C.
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knowledge also occurs in cases that do not lead to the filing of patent
applications. 160 Therefore, a solution anchored solely in patent law
would not solve all potential disputes over misappropriation of
traditional knowledge. Any global solution will consequently require
an interdisciplinary approach combining different legal161-including
intellectual property, 162 unfair competition, biodiversity, and,
potentially, tangible 163 and intangible cultural property laws-and
non-legal fields. 164 Such an interdisciplinary approach should create
mutually beneficial interactions between the respective fields, as well
as between people and institutions involved, both national and
international. This sharing of ideas could pave the way for the
implementation of an effective benefit sharing system for use of
traditional knowledge, thereby ensuring the protection of
1
communities without overly burdening other stakeholders. 65

160.
161.

Arezzo, supra note 69, at 389.
See Draft TKPrinciples, supra note 2, annex, at 16, art. 2(1).

The protection of traditional knowledge against misappropriation may be
implemented through a range of legal measures, including: a special law on
traditional knowledge; laws on intellectual property, including laws governing
unfair competition and unjust enrichment; the law of contracts; the law of civil
liability, including torts and liability for compensation; criminal law; laws
concerning the interests of indigenous peoples; fisheries laws and
environmental laws; regimes governing access and benefit-sharing; or any
other law or any combination of those laws.
Id.
162.
The interaction between the protection of traditional knowledge and the
protection of intellectual property rights is already a complex issue itself. See generally
CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 1-34 (2006); INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2d. ed. 2008); Coenraad J. Visser,
Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for TraditionalKnowledge, in POOR PEOPLE'S
KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 207 (J.
Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org!
researchlPoorPeoplesKnowledge.pdf (analyzing intellectual property rights and
traditional knowledge).
163.
This Article tentatively adopted this approach with respect to the potential
analogies between regulations protecting cultural property and those governing
traditional knowledge. See supra Part III.A. The protection of traditional knowledge is
considered a part of cultural heritage. See ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 147, at 325 (devoting Part 7 to a discussion of traditional
knowledge).
164.
One example is anthropology. See Shane Greene, Indigenous People
Incorporated?: Culture as Politics, Culture as Property in Pharmaceutical
Bioprospecting, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 211, 211-24 (2004) (examining various
indigenous methods used in contemporaneous pharmaceutical bioprospecting through
field data and comparative analysis).
165.
See Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 51, at 164-65 (noting in their
conclusion that a balanced system of obligation to disclose should be adopted in order
to prevent the appropriation of genetic resources without deterring research and
development activities based on such resources).

